Muslims in Ethiopia in the Recent Internal Crisis

Muslims in Ethiopia in the Recent Internal Crisis

Position and Role … Impact and Influence

Dr. Mohammad Safar
Director, Center for Muslim Minority Studies – Istanbul
Professor of Comparative Religion – Researcher in Islamic Movements

The Muslim Community in Ethiopia

The presence of Muslims in present-day Ethiopia predates the establishment of this modern nation-state. The first Muslim community in Ethiopia formed before the migration of Muslims to Medina, and Islam gradually spread through the Ethiopian highlands until it became the dominant religion. This expansion soon aroused Christian resentment and led to a doctrinal and political conflict lasting more than six centuries between Muslims and Christians — from the Islamic emirates extending from Zeila to the movement of Ahmad ibn Ibrahim (Gran) in Harar, and the Ethiopian Christian kingdoms, which ended with the defeat of Muslims in 1887 through international intervention by Portugal and the Catholic Church, and the rise of European colonial domination over the Horn of Africa.

Muslims are spread across most geographic regions and ethnic groups in Ethiopia, concentrated largely in the eastern, southeastern, and northwestern areas. They belong to multiple ethnic communities, notably the Oromo and Somalis, the Sidama, and groups among the Amhara and Tigrayans. The Oromo, who comprise nearly half of Ethiopia’s population, are mostly Muslim — roughly 80% — while Muslims among the Amhara and Tigrayans exceed 15%, approximately three million people.

The following table illustrates the distribution of Muslims across ethnic groups in Ethiopia:

Muslims in Ethiopia thus constitute more than 56% of the population — approximately 36 million out of more than 67 million Ethiopians. Most Ethiopian Muslims follow the Shafi’i school of law, with smaller numbers of Hanafis and Malikis, and minorities of Zaydis and Ismailis. Most Ethiopian Muslims participate in Sufi orders.

Political Presence of Muslims in Ethiopia

The political situation of Muslims in Ethiopia can be divided into four phases: (1) absolute monarchy lasting centuries until the death of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974, during which Muslims had no role; (2) the communist regime under Mengistu, which worsened their condition; (3) democratic pluralism beginning with Mengistu’s fall in 1991; and (4) the post-Meles Zenawi era and political-religious opening.

Muslims’ political situation began improving after 1991 with Mengistu’s fall. The 1995 constitutional revision affirmed separation of religion and state and declared no state religion. It also stipulated non-interference by the state in religious affairs and by religion in state affairs — a positive step recognizing the Muslim community and correcting previous policies that treated Christianity as the official religion.

Under President Meles Zenawi (until 2006), authorities allowed Muslims to apply Sharia-derived laws in special courts for personal and family matters, permitted Muslim schools teaching Islam and Arabic, and declared all religions equal. Muslim holidays became official state holidays. Meles’s government included 12 Muslim ministers for the first time. The Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs became active in education, da’wa, and mosque building. Muslims benefited significantly from democratic opening under the new federal constitution.

The new constitution introduced federalism, dividing Ethiopia into nine regions and nine nationalities, with seven minorities allowed to use their languages in primary education. Before federalism and secularization, many Muslims avoided government schools due to the absence of Arabic and Islamic curricula, limiting their access to government positions. Most engaged in trade, pastoralism, and agriculture, keeping Muslim political influence weak despite their large numbers.

Under Abiy Ahmed, reconciliation with Muslims became explicit. His government supported formation of the Supreme Council of Muslims and recognized its legitimacy after sixty years of demands, announcing the Council in May 2019 with Sheikh Haj Omar Idris as president, and opening the first Islamic college.

Muslims’ Position in the Recent Crisis

First: The recent crisis centered on Tigray region, which rebelled against the central government. Muslims constitute the smallest proportion among the four regions with Muslim populations: Somali region (~97% Muslim, ~5 million), Afar (~99%, ~1.5 million), Amhara (~18%), and Tigray (~5%, scattered without a central base).

Second: The crisis is not between a predominantly Muslim region and is not religious in nature. It is a power struggle between the Tigray and Amhara ethnic groups that alternated in ruling Ethiopia. The Tigray dominated through Meles Zenawi’s government; Abiy Ahmed’s rise restored Amhara influence in alliance with the Oromo. Abiy targeted Tigray leaders citing corruption and human rights violations. Other ethnic groups feel grievance over Tigray dominance and privileges during their rule, making their stance closer to passive neutrality favoring the government.

Third: The absence of a unified Islamic bloc — whether as a movement or political party — muted Muslim voices in dialogue, negotiation, or peaceful initiatives. Muslims are still at the beginning of legitimizing their religious institutions despite violent crises in Somali region (2017) and Oromo restrictions on leaders such as Jawar Mohammed.

Fourth: Oromo support for Abiy granted Muslim Oromo advantages in power despite recent tensions, placing them between supporting the government they helped bring to power or opposing policies affecting internal unity. The absence of some Oromo front leaders may also explain the lack of a clear voice on the crisis.

Impact on Muslims in the Recent Crisis

Muslims in Ethiopia are expected to be negatively affected if the crisis escalates into armed rebellion, guerrilla war, resource depletion, federal institution targeting, or military coup — especially given armed militias among major ethnic groups and Tigray influence within the military. This could return Muslims to conditions before the 1995 federal constitution, cancel or postpone elections, and possibly lead to Abiy Ahmed’s resignation under internal and external pressure.

Negative impact is also expected if other ethnic issues — Somali, Afar, or Oromo fronts with large Muslim populations — are handled similarly through isolated confrontation. Accusations persist that previous governments tried to control the Islamic current through supporting the Al-Ahbash group and imposing state-aligned figures to limit Muslim community influence, alongside Abiy’s support for American evangelical Protestant figures in his administration.

Positive impact is expected if the crisis strengthens genuine federalism, redistributing influence among the nine regions according to population, resources, and contribution — especially if Muslims activate the Supreme Council for Muslim Affairs into an effective institution supporting community development and cooperation with the state, civil society, and Islamic groups on the ground.

Positive impact may also result if the crisis leads to ethnic and governmental humility, fair elections, and formation of Islamic parties competing electorally — enabling Muslims to achieve aspirations through constitutional rights rather than operating under non-Islamic identities or state patronage.

Originally published at the Egyptian Institute for Political and Strategic Studies (EIPSS):
eipss-eg.org